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NEW DIMENSIONS TO THE THIN CORPORATION
WALLER H. HORSLEY*
Since the advent of corporate taxation, stockholders have attempted
to take down current earnings and ultimately recover their investment
free of the double tax imposed on dividend distributions. The use of
debt in a corporation's capital structure is ideally suited for such pur-
poses-the interest distributed is not taxable to the corporation, and
principal curtailments on a loan are nontaxable to the stockholder-
creditor.' Purely on the basis of its tax aspects, therefore, consideration
of the use of debt in a corporation's capital structure has become part
of the standard checkoff list upon incorporating or making further
contributions to a corporation.
Over the years, principles of tax law have evolved to temper purely
tax avoidance schemes with the heat of a judicially imposed business
purpose. The tests imposed in this area have now passed through the
eras of the hybrid instrument2 and ratio judging3 and into an era of
subjective sniffing in an effort to determine the true bona fides or sub-
stantial economic reality of the corporation's debt structure.4
Left with a subjective, facts-and-circumstances test for determining
the legitimacy of stockholder debt, the courts in recent years have
developed new approaches for resolving the basic issue, expanded sig-
nificantly the area of tainted debt, and laid the groundwork for a num-
ber of harmful side effects after the stockholder debt has been reclas-
sified. It is the purpose of this article to point out certain of these new
dimensions to the traditional thinly capitalized corporation.
* Member, Virginia Bar. B.A., 1953, LL.B., 1959, University of Virginia. Partner,
Hunton, Williams, Gay, Powell & Gibson, Richmond, Virginia. Formerly Lecturer in
Taxation, University of Virginia Law School.
1. A creditor may have a tax to pay if the basis of the debt is less than the
principal amounts received. One of the more frequently overlooked areas here is the
required allocation of asset basis in incorporations and other S 351 transfers. See I.R.C.
S 358. For example, if assets worth $100,000 but with a basis of $60,000 are transferred
to a controlled corporation in exchange for $40,000 in stock and $60,000 in securities, the
securities take a basis of only $36,000 (i.e., 60% of $60,000) so that a $24,000 gain would
be realized on their sale or retirement.
2. See John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946).
3. See, e.g., Caplin, The Caloric Count of a Thin Incorporation, N.Y.U. 17H INsr. ON
FED. TAx. 771 (1959).
4. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002
(1959); Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
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A NEW APPROACH: "ESSENTIAL OPERATING ASSETS"
Fully aside from tax considerations, a businessman is often persuaded
to incorporate his sole proprietorship or partnership and thereby obtain
a limit to his personal liability for the subsequent debts and obligations
of the business. This fundamental attribute of the corporate business
form is undoubtedly the most compelling reason for its use. The use of
debt in a corporation's capital structure further aids a stockholder in
his desire to limit his losses by allowing him to share with other credi-
tors of equal rank.
Every business today is financed at least in part by borrowed funds.
It is hard for a businessman to understand, therefore, why anyone would
raise an objection to his wanting to limit his risk to so much, and only
so much, of his own investment.
Often a factor of almost conclusive importance in the thin capitaliza-
tion determination is the availability of credit from established financial
institutions, such as banks and insurance companies. Few Will contend
that borrowing from a stockholder is improper in a case where such
borrowing was available from the professional community upon the
same terms and conditions (and without the stockholder's endorsement
or guaranty). Nevertheless, the courts today are tending to find that
the transfer of assets essential to the conduct of the business points to
a permanent investment in the risk of the business rather than a tem-
porary loan, with the result that any stockholder debt with respect to
such assets is deemed to be equity ("at the risk of the business") rather
than debt.
In one of the first decisions to emphasize this feature, the court did
not say that this was a conclusive factor, but announced as follows:
We think the nature of the assets, and their continued necessity
to the running of the business are relevant considerations in de-
termining the intent of the parties in making the transfer, to be
taken together with the other evidence of lack of realistic expec-
tation of payment in cash when due according to the face of the
note, and that the notes were extended when they became due.5
Other courts have since required stockholders to invest as equity
amounts at least to a level necessary to purchase the corporation's "core
assets and get its business underway." 6
5. Brake & Electric Sales Corp. v. United States, 287 F.2d 426, 428 (1st Cir. 1961).
6. See J. S. Biritz Construction Co. v. Commissioner, - F.2d -, 20 AFTR2d 5891
19681 1067
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
If this line of reasoning is carried to its ultimate limit, the only form
of legitimate stockholder debt recognized by the courts will be debt
incurred for expansion purposes. Clearly such a result would be an un-
realistic intrusion into legitimate business decisions. The better rule
would be to look for a substantial capital investment dedicated to the
business, 7 and then apply as necessary other tests to delve into the stock-
holder's intent to be a true creditor of his corporation.
EXTENSION OF THE TAINT: GUARANTEED LOANS
If a corporation borrows money from a bank or other financial insti-
tution, the interest paid becomes a true expense to the stockholder
owners (i.e., it is paid to others), but the stockholder has effectively
limited his investment in the corporation and avoided the problems of
recovering his investment after the venture proves profitable. Thus, one
of the important tax advantages of the thinly capitalized corporation
can often be obtained through a bank loan personally endorsed or
guaranteed by the stockholders.
In Murphy Logging Co. v. United States," the taxpayers organized
a corporation with $1,500 in capital stock and proceeded to sell to it
some $240,000 of machinery and equipment (stepping up the basis for
depreciation in the days before recapture). The new corporation bor-
rowed this purchase price from a local bank, and the stockholders per-
sonally guaranteed the corporation's loan. Reversing the district court's
holding that the transaction involved an indirect loan to the corporation
by its stockholders, the Ninth Circuit recently refused to hold the thin
capitalization doctrine applicable to this transaction.
A somewhat similar approach to a corporation's guaranteed debt was
attempted by the Commissioner in Ackerson v. United States,9 with the
(8th Cir. 1967); Wood Preserving Corp. v. United States, 347 F.2d 117 (4th Cir.
1965). But see Charles D. Vantress, 23 CCH TAX CT. MEM. 711 (1964).
7. In Brake & Electric Sales Corp., 287 F.2d 426 (1st Cir. 1961) the stockholders
took $20,000 in stock and $90,000 in notes, and there was testimony that the stock
was worth $210,000 on incorporation after taking goodwill into account. In Wood
Preserving Corp., 347 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1965) $25,000 was taken in stock, and
$130,000 was reflected in an open account. Both of these would appear to represent
a substantial equity commitment.
8. 378 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1967).
9. -- F. Supp. -- , 20 AFTR2d 5616 (W.D. Ky. 1967). Accord, Fors Farms, Inc.
v. United States, -- F. Supp. -- , 17 AFTR2d 222 (W.D. Wash. 1965). See generally
Hickman, The Thin Corporation: Another Look at an Old Disease, 44 TAxEs 883,
889-91 (1966).
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same result. There the stockholders had caused their corporation to
purchase a business, paying $20,000 in cash and $100,000 by the cor-
poration's note personally guaranteed by the stockholders. Subsequently
the corporation's note was refinanced through the bank, and the personal
guarantees were continued. The Commissioner took the position that
payments on the corporation's notes represented dividends to the stock-
holder/guarantors. The district court would have none of it.
The opinions in both of these cases emphasized that there were sub-
stantial unreflected assets which would lend additional value to the
capital stock of the corporation. This emphasis has caused concern that
the courts were making a basic determination that the corporations
were not thinly capitalized-a conclusion that would considerably dilute
the standing of these cases as authority for the proposition that a guar-
anteed loan from an independent financial institution is safe from a thin
capitalization attack.
ExTENsIoN OF THE TAINT: LOANS FROM NONSTOCKHOLDERS
Taking a step beyond the indirect stockholder loan, the Commis-
sioner has attacked loans by nonstockholders where no personal liabil-
ity of the stockholders of record is involved. Initially, these cases in-
volved a family member or dominant employee serving as lendor to the
corporation, but the rule has now been extended to otherwise com-
pletely independent parties.
In The Motel Co. v. Commissioner,'0 the sole stockholder put up
$10,000 in cash and his father loaned the corporation $100,000 for the
purchase of the motel. The father's loan was a third mortgage, ten-year
note which remained in continuous default as to principal payments.
Although acknowledging that the father was not a stockholder of rec-
ord, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's finding that the
father's note represented a capital investment, emphasizing the close
family relationship, the use of the money for the purchase of the cor-
poration's principal income-producing asset, the 25-to-I debt to equity
ratio, and the unlikelihood of an outsider lending $100,000 to the cor-
poration at that time on a third mortgage. The court concluded that
the father's advance was "a contribution to risk capital, not merely a
risky-loan." "
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Foresun, Inc. v.
10. 340 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1965).
11. ld. at 446.
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Commissioner.2 There the mother purported to sell to the children's
corporations certain real estate for $25,000 in cash and a note for $200,-
000 secured by a second mortgage. Again, no principal payments were
made on this note. The court affirmed the Tax Court's conclusion that
the mother was really "a preferred stockholder, not a creditor." 13
Departing from the close family relation category is the case of Merlo
Builders, Inc.14 There a substantial loan was obtained from the stock-
holders' attorney and the attorney's business partner. The attorney was
found to have given the stockholder advice concerning corporate mat-
ters, but he was not an officer or director of the corporation; further,
his business partner did not directly participate in any of the transac-
tions involved. The attorney did not at any time have a right or option
to buy stock, nor was there any understanding between the stockholders
and the attorney that the attorney would ever have a stock interest in
any of the companies. Nevertheless, the Tax Court felt that the "sub-
stance" of the transactions made both the attorney and his business
partner stocknolders m the corporation.
Treating nonstockholders as stockholders, 5 however, can be tricky
business. Imagine counsel's concern when he learns that his corporate
client suddenly. has an issue of preferred stock, the limitations and pref-
erences of which are not set forth in the corporation's charter as re-
quired by law; or else he has additional shares of common stock which
have received, without authorization by the corporation's board of
directors, dividends on a non pro-rata basis and perhaps impairing the
corporation's capital and resulting in personal liability for the directors.
Hopefully, individual stockholders would not be encouraged to adopt
the Commissioner's findings and attempt to readjust the situation for
corporate law purposes, too. If such were the case, conceivably cor-
porate authority for actions authorized by directors elected with notice
only to the shareholders of record would have to be ratified or sustained
on a de facto basis.
HARMFUL SIDE EFFECTS: THE NATURE OF RECLASSIFIED DEBT
Assuming stockholder (or nonstockholder) loans (or guaranteed
12. 348 F;2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1965).
13. Id. at 1008.
14. 23 CCH TAX CT. Mm. 185 (1964).
15. To the same effect are Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635 (1965), where brothers and
wives were involved, and Old Dominion Plywood Corp., 25 CCH TAx CT. MAm. 678
(1966), where a sister corporation was the lender.
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loans) are disqualified as debt, what are they? Do we disregard the
written instrument requiring payment of a sum certain at a fixed and
determinable time and place and deem the note a mere contribution to
capital; or do we call it a preferred stock, a second class of participating
stock, or something else?
Congress expressly declined to attempt any definition of the term
"stock" when enacting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.18 Reclas-
sified debt has heretofore been described loosely in the decisions, per-
haps most often as a contribution to capital on the theory that an
instrument deemed not valid as what it purports to be should not be
deemed valid for any purpose.17 But new pressures are now being ex-
erted here, and it is almost impossible to deny the status of nonstock-
holder debt as a second class of stock when reclassified as an equity
investment.
1. Subchapter S Qualification
In the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958, Congress defined
"equity capital," for purposes of the special treatment of losses on small
business stock, to include all stockholder debt.'8  Subsequently, the
Treasury Department issued its regulations concerning the stock classi-
fication of electing small business corporations (Subchapter S), stating
that, if an instrument purporting to be debt was actually stock, it would
constitute a second class of stock and disqualify a Subchapter S elec-
tion."9 Even though it was apparent that Congress had not intended
to eliminate all stockholder debt in Subchapter S corporations,"0 tax
practitioners became very leary of the prospects.
In the first test of the Treasury's regulation, the Tax Court2' and a
district court22 acknowledged, if not accepted, the second class of stock
16. See S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1954). See generally, Carlberg v.
United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960).
17. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 409 (2d Cir. 1957) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). But see Pocatello Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 912, 916 (ED. Idaho 1956) (deemed a preferred stock).
18. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1244(c) (2).
19. Regs. § 1.1371-1(g) (1966).
20. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 1376(b) (2) which expressly refers to stockholder in-
debtedness in establishing rules for basis adjustments for net operating losses. The Tax
Court will not allow a stockholder to increase his basis here for any corporate debts
which he has merely guaranteed. William H. Perry, 47 T.C. 159 (1966).
21. Catalina Homes, Inc, 23 CCH TAx CT. MAm. 1361 (1964).
22. Henderson v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 782 (D. Ala. 1965).
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interpretation. Where the issue was brought more clearly into focus
in the Tax Court, however, it was conceded that pro-rata stockholder
debt did not constitute a second class of stock but merely an additional
contribution to capital by the stockholders. 2 3
The Treasury Department has now conceded the issue in W. C.
Gaminan24 by amending its regulations to provide that, "if such pur-
ported debt obligations are owned solely by the owners of the nominal
stock of the corporation in substantially the same proportion as they
own such nominal stock, such purported debt obligations will be treated
as contributions to capital rather than a second class of stock." 25 The
new regulation, however, makes it quite explicit that the Commissioner
will make a "new determination" if a non pro-rata transaction involving
the purported obligation results in a change in the stockholders' per-
centage of stock or purported debt. The Commissioner has already made
two such attempts, both of which failed.26
Actually, there seems to be very little reason to apply thin capitaliza-
tion concepts to a Subchapter S corporation since the design of the
Subchapter S election specifically eliminates the double tax which the
interest deduction and tax-free recovery of investment seek to avoid. As
for corporations only lately electing Subchapter S treatment, the pres-
ent statutory treatment on withdrawals of pre-Subchapter S accumulated
earnings and profits should be protection enough without disqualifying
the current election.
2. Problems of Control
Taking a cue from the Subchapter S cases reviewed above, it is not
hard to project new areas which will add another dimension to the
harmful thin capitalization side effects. Throughout the Internal Rev-
enue Code, there are numerous tax consequences which attach to tax-
payers or events which stand in certain control relationships.
In some of these areas, the taxpayer may find himself urging that
stockholder debt is in fact an equity investment and should be treated
23. W. C. Gamman, 46 T.C. 1 (1966) (en banc).
24. Id.
25. Regs. S 1.1371-1(g) (1966).
26. In Lewis Bldg. and Supplies, Inc., 25 CCH TAx CT. MEM. 844 (1966) there was
only a slight disproportion of debt, but in August F. Nielsen Co., 27 CCH TAX CT.
MEM. 44 (1968), the notes at the time of the Subchapter S election had been curtailed
unequally so that one stockholder held $5,000 in unpaid principal to the other's
$10,000.
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as stock. For example, in the personal holding company area, three
individuals holding $25,000 in stock have urged that a bank's note for
$625,000 be considered as stock, so that more than 50% in value of the
outstanding stock of the corporation would be held by a nonindividual
and the corporation could avoid personal holding company status.28
Generally, however, a reclassification of stockholder debt may serve
to work against the taxpayer's best interest. This could be true in the
personal holding company area, where the debt is held by certain of the
individuals who would not otherwise be classified as owning, in the
aggregate, over 50% in value of the corporation's stock. Here also,
reclassified stockholder debt may jeopardize the percentages necessary
to avoid treatment of copyright royalties, amounts received as compen-
sation for the use of property by a shareholder, and amounts received
under personal service contracts as personal holding company income.29
A number of Code sections depart from a percentage-of-stock value
when determining a control relationship. These include:
§ 267, dealing with the disallowance of losses and certain unpaid
expenses and interest as between a corporation and a person owning,
or deemed to own, more than 50% in value of its outstanding stock;
§ 269, disallowing deductions or credits to a person acquiring at least
50% in value of the stock of a corporation for principally tax avoidance
purposes;
§ 303, allowing a redemption to pay funeral and administrative ex-
penses and death taxes, but, where more than two corporations are
involved, denying such treatment if the other stockholders hold 25%
or more of the aggregate value of the stock of either corporation;
§ 304, classifying a purchase of stock as a redemption through a
related corporation upon a finding of at least 50% ownership in value
of the stock of both corporations;
§ 318(a) (2) (C), providing a reattribution of stock ownership to or
from a corporation based on a holding of 50% or more in value of its
stock;
27. Such seemingly inconsistent positions have heretofore been urged by taxpayers
in noncontrol situations, such as to avoid taxable gain in a § 351 transfer where the
stockholder debt is in the form of notes rather than securities. In Campbell v. Carter
Foundation Production Co., 322 F.2d 827 (5th Cir. 1963), the taxpayer was allowed
to classify certain installment notes as debt for interest payment purposes and as equity
securities for carryover of basis for depreciation purposes.
28. Washmont Corp. v. Hendricksen, 137 F.2d 306 (9th Cir. 1943).
29. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §543 (a) (4), (6), (7).
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§ 341 (e) (1), applying stricter rules for exemption from collapsible
corporation treatment to stockholders owning more than 5% or 20%
in value of the corporation's stock;
§ 382 (a) (1), denying a loss corporation the continued use of its
net operating loss carryover after a change in its business and an increase
of 50% in value of its stock ownership;
§ 1235, denying capital gains on the sale of a patent where the sale
is made to a person owning 25% or more of the transferor's stock;
§ 1239, denying capital gains on a sale of depreciable property by a
stockholder to his corporation if he is deemed to own more than 80%
in value of its outstanding stock; and
§ 1551, causing a disallowance of the corporate surtax exemption
and accumulated earnings credit where there is an 80% in value control
relationship.
Of the foregoing sections, the disallowance of the use of a net operat-
ing loss carryover under § 382(a) (1) would seem to be an area par-
ticularly vulnerable to attack. In the typical § 382 (a) situation, the new
owners almost certainly can be expected to place additional debt in the
loss corporation's capital structure. It would be indeed anomalous if
the thin capitalization doctrine were to be applied to deny a net operat-
ing loss carryover even in the context of a legitimate rehabilitation
program consistent with the intent of Congress to encourage, by means
of such a deduction, further attempts to salvage a losing business.
3. A Separate Class of Stock
Also in this unexplored area fall many of the basic corporate trans-
.cions 'which rely upon a § 368(c) approach to the definition of con-
tr.&L, 3equiring ownership of 80% of each class of stock. If the second
'class of stock theory prevails, as originally promulgated under the Sub-
-chapter S regulations and at least to some extent reserved in the Gam-
mn case, a number of basic evolutions will be jeopardized:
Under 1 165 (g) (3), a corporation will be denied ordinary loss treat-
ment for 'worthless securities in an affiliated corporation if it is not
deemed to own directly at least 95% of each class of its stock.
Under § 351, even though an initial incorporation can aggregate all
the transferors as a group for control purposes, a subsequent transfer to
tthe corporation by a purported 80% stockholder (or stockholder group)
:may not -qualify for tax-free treatment unless he (or they) also hold
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80% of the stockholder (or nonstockholder) debt to be reclassified as
a second class of stock.
Under the spin-off rules of § 355, no tax-free distribution of stock in
a subsidiary will be allowed unless the parent corporation also can be
deemed to own 80% of the thin debt if deemed a second class of stock.
Under a B reorganization, 0 the acquiring corporation must obtain not
only 80% of the acknowledged classes of stock but also 80% of any
reclassified stockholder (or nonstockholder) debt, or the entire reor-
ganization will fail.
4. A Preferred or Common Stock
Finally, there are areas in which the classification of thin debt as a
second class of stock must be refined further in order to determine
whether such stock is a preferred or common stock.3' Such instances
include:
Disqualification of a susbtantially disproportionate redemption under
§ 302(b) (2), resulting from a failure to meet the 80% test, if the stock-
holder debt is deemed to be a separate class of common stock, but not
if it is deemed to be some other class;
Treatment of the redemption of the stockholder debt under § 306
unless it is deemed to be a class of common stock;
Disqualification of a complete liquidation under § 332 if the parent
corporation does not own at least 80% of each class of stock except
nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends;
Disqualification of a step-up in basis under § 3 34(b) (2) if the ac-
quiring corporation does not own at least 80% of each class of stock
except nonvoting stock which is limited and preferred as to dividends;
Disqualification under the affiliation test of § 1504(a) for filing con-
solidated returns (also applicable to the dividends received deduction
under § 243) unless the reclassified stockholder debt is deemed to be a
class of stock which is nonvoting and limited and preferred as to
dividends.
30. To a lesser extent such a thin classification can jeopardize an A or C reorganiza-
tion involving a transfer of assets to a subsidiary if the control required by § 368(a)
(2) (C) is not met.
31. Under the liquidation sections, if the Commissioner can transpose his theory to
State corporate law, the plan of liquidation has not been adopted if the reclassified
debt has not been given notice and an opportunity to vote as a separate class.
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HARMFUL SIDE EFFECTS: COMPLETE TERMINATIONS
The Commissioner's "domino theory" can apply in other areas, so
that the corporation's loss of the interest deduction or dividend taxation
on a recovered investment are not the only risks to be run.
One of the dominoes that may fall with the classification of an instru-
ment as equity rather than debt is an otherwise timely liquidation under
§ 337. Under that section, the tax-free sale by the corporation of assets
pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation is conditioned upon the dis-
tribution of all the assets of the corporation within twelve months after
the adoption of the plan, although the corporation may retain sufficient
assets to meet contingent liabilities and the claims of its creditors. The
regulations here are explicit: "no amount may be set aside to meet claims
of shareholders with respect to their stock." 32 Finding stockholder debt
to be in fact equity capital, the Tax Court has disqualified a § 337 liqui-
dation when assets were retained beyond the twelve-month period to
satisfy the purported debt.3 The increasing prevalence of findings of
thin debt in the hands of nonstockholders in such cases should cause
even greater concern.
A similar result will follow in other cases where tax results flow from
the completion of a plan of final liquidation. 4 More significantly, a
stock redemption attempting to qualify under § 302(b) (3) as a com-
plete termination of interest could similarly be disqualified.
CONCLUSION
Other areas may also bear the brunt of the unfortunate results which
accrue from a reclassification of stockholder debt to equity. The fore-
going should be enough, however, to concern any tax practitioner, and
to cause him to look above the net worth section and scan the entire
right hand side of the corporate balance sheet.
The courts in recent times have shown a remarkable tendency in this
area to disregard most of the basic concepts of corporate law governing
the issuance of stock. Little comfort can be taken today in the hope
that the Commissioner will not be able to persuade the courts at some
further point, based on a set of facts carefully chosen for such purpose,
to extend the dimensions of the thin capitalization doctrine into all of
these areas.
32. Regs.S 1.337-2(b).
33. John Town, Inc., 46 T.C. 107 (1966), aff'd - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1967).
34. E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 332, 333.
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